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MODERATING MAYO† 
Bernard Chao 
ABSTRACT—The Supreme Court’s latest pronouncements on patentable 
subject matter in Mayo v. Prometheus have already created a firestorm of 
controversy. The Court found that various limitations did not add enough to 
the law of nature that lies at the heart of Prometheus’ medical diagnostic 
patents to render the claims patent eligible. Because the Supreme Court 
never explained what “enough” is, critics have been quick to deride Mayo 
and warn that it would radically limit patent eligibility in a wide-ranging 
number of industries. Although I agree with the ultimate result reached by 
the Supreme Court, I am also concerned that its reasoning unnecessarily 
jeopardizes too many deserving patents. But the decision does not have to 
create the havoc that so many fear. There is room for a more restrained 
understanding of Mayo. 
This Essay offers a moderate interpretation of Mayo by building on 
recent efforts to revive the out-of-favor “point-of- novelty” analysis. For 
years, patent law has refused to consider an invention’s point of novelty in 
its decisionmaking. In other words, the law does not attribute any special 
significance to a subset of claim limitations regardless of how important 
those limitations are to the invention; patent law treats all the limitations as 
equally important. However, it makes no sense for patent law to take such a 
formalistic approach and ignore the fundamental idea underlying a patent’s 
invention. Fortunately, the Mayo decision implicitly adopts some point-of-
novelty thinking. This Essay builds on these ideas to develop a fuller point-
of-novelty framework that explains when a claim has added enough to an 
unpatentable concept to make it patent eligible. By applying this approach 
to both Prometheus’ claims and a hypothetical claim that Prometheus could 
have drafted, this Essay explains how Mayo can be interpreted as only a 
modest rejection of a particular type of abstract claim. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Patent law has long held that laws of nature, natural phenomena, and 
abstract ideas are not patentable. At the same time, many patents cover 
applications that grow out of these fundamental concepts. Courts have 
recognized that such applications are patentable. Observers had hoped that 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo v. Prometheus would illuminate the 
line between unpatentable concepts and patentable applications of those 
concepts. Unfortunately, the recent decision issued by the Supreme Court 
raises more questions than it answers.1 Although the Court gave a variety of 
reasons to explain why Prometheus Laboratories’ (Prometheus) patents 
were not patent eligible, the Court’s primary rationale involved dissecting 
Prometheus’ claim. The Court found that the limitations did not add 
“enough” to the law of nature that lies at the heart of Prometheus’ 
invention. 
Because the Court never explained what “enough” is, critics have been 
quick to deride Mayo.2 One commentator went so far as to say that the 
decision “creates a framework for patent eligibility in which almost any 
 
1  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
2  Michael Risch, Patentable Subject Matter, the Supreme Court, and Me, MADISONIAN.NET (Mar. 
20, 2012), http://madisonian.net/2012/03/20/patentable-subject-matter-the-supreme-court-and-me/ 
(complaining about how difficult it will be to determine what detail needs to be added); see also Ryan 
Chirnomas, Supreme Court Strikes Down Diagnostic Method Claims as Non-Patent-Eligible Subject 
Matter, CAFC BLOG (Mar. 20, 2012), http://whda.com/cafc/2012/03/20/supreme-court-strikes-down-
diagnostic-method-claims-as-non-patent-eligible-subject-matter/ (“[T]his decision is deeply disturbing 
to many patent practitioners as well as those in the diagnostics industry.”); Gene Quinn, Killing 
Industry: The Supreme Court Blows Mayo v. Prometheus, IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 20, 2012, 1:44 PM), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/03/20/supreme-court-mayo-v-prometheus/id=22920/ (“The sky is 
falling! . . . Those in the biotech, medical diagnostics and pharmaceutical industries have just been taken 
out behind the woodshed and summarily executed . . . .”). 
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method claim can be invalidated.”3 Although I agree with the Supreme 
Court’s ultimate decision, I am also concerned that its reasoning 
unnecessarily jeopardizes many deserving patents that have not previously 
been thought to have any vulnerability under 35 U.S.C. § 101—the federal 
patent statute that defines what types of subject matter may be patented.4 By 
failing to provide a framework for determining when additional limitations 
can change an unpatentable concept into a patentable application, the 
Supreme Court has cast doubt on a host of less controversial patents. But 
the decision does not have to wreak the havoc that many fear it will. There 
is room for a more restrained understanding of Mayo. 
This Essay rehabilitates the decision in Mayo by building on recent 
efforts to revive the out-of-favor “point-of-novelty” analysis. A patent’s 
point of novelty is the claim limitation or limitations that correspond to the 
heart or gist of the invention.5 For years, patent law has refused to consider 
an invention’s point of novelty in its decisionmaking. In other words, the 
law does not attribute any special significance to a subset of claim 
limitations regardless of how important those limitations are to the 
invention; patent law treats all limitations as equally important. Recently, 
Professor Mark Lemley and I have separately criticized the failure to 
consider the point of novelty in a wide-ranging number of doctrines.6 
Lemley succinctly summarized the problem in the Northwestern University 
Law Review when he asserted that “[i]t makes little sense for a law focused 
on invention to pay no attention to what is inventive about the patentee’s 
technology.”7 
Interestingly, the Mayo decision implicitly uses point-of-novelty 
thinking, but its ideas are underdeveloped. This Essay relies on the Court’s 
ideas to create a fuller point-of-novelty framework for patentable subject 
matter. This framework creates a clearer boundary that separates claims that 
cover unpatentable concepts—like Prometheus’ claim—from claims 
directed at patentable applications of those concepts. Under such a 
 
3  Robert R. Sachs, Punishing Prometheus: The Supreme Court’s Blunders in Mayo v. Prometheus, 
PATENTLY-O (Mar. 26, 2012, 9:10 AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/03/punishing-
prometheus-the-supreme-courts-blunders-in-mayo-v-prometheus.html. But see Chris Holman, Mayo v. 
Prometheus: Analysis and Implications of an Important Supreme Court Decision, HOLMAN’S BIOTECH 
IP BLOG (Mar. 21, 2012, 5:20 PM), http://holmansbiotechipblog.blogspot.co.uk/2012/03/prometheus-v-
mayo-analysis-and.html (“[I]mplemented literally, [the Mayo decision] would seem to deny patent 
protection to much of biotechnology . . . . However, I think in practice the lower courts will attempt to 
limit the impact of the decision, and find ways to maintain patent eligibility for drug methods of 
treatment . . . .”). 
4  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
5  A patent’s claims define the scope of the patentee’s property rights. Each claim is made up of a 
number of separate limitations. To fall within a claim, each of those limitations must be present. 
6  See Bernard Chao, Breaking Aro’s Commandment: Recognizing that Inventions Have Heart, 
20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1183 (2010); Mark A. Lemley, Point of Novelty, 
105 NW. U. L. REV. 1253 (2011). 
7  Lemley, supra note 6, at 1274–75. 
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framework, courts would first examine the limitation that embodies the 
point of novelty to determine whether it describes an unpatentable concept. 
If it does, the law should then determine whether the other limitations can 
bring the principle into the realm of patentable subject matter. That occurs 
when the other limitations are both concrete and strongly connected to the 
point of novelty. However, if the other limitations do not satisfy these 
requirements, the claim is not patent eligible. 
Finally, this Essay applies the proposed framework to Prometheus’ 
claims and confirms that they are not patent eligible. It then applies the 
same approach to a claim that Prometheus could have drafted. Under the 
point-of-novelty analysis, this hypothetical claim turns out to be patentable. 
This result demonstrates how Mayo can be interpreted and applied in the 
future as only a modest rejection of a particular type of abstract claim. 
I. THE TENSION IN PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER 
Section 101 of the Patent Act broadly defines patentable subject matter 
as “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”8 Although the 
legislative history of the Patent Act suggested that “anything under the sun 
that is made by man” is patent eligible, the courts have created exceptions.9 
Laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas are not eligible to 
be patented.10 But an invention is not unpatentable simply because it 
contains one of these unpatentable concepts.11 “[A]n application of a law of 
nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be 
deserving of patent protection.”12 Courts have had difficulty determining 
when a patent is drawn to one of these unpatentable concepts as opposed to 
a patentable application. That is because the Supreme Court has never 
provided a framework for determining when additional limitations change 
an unpatentable idea into a patentable application. 
The Supreme Court unsuccessfully attempted to provide guidance on 
this issue less than two years ago in Bilski v. Kappos.13 In that case, the 
Federal Circuit had ruled that the machine-or-transformation test was the 
sole test for determining the patentability of a “process” under § 101.14 In 
other words, a process was only patentable if it was tied to a particular 
machine or transformed an article to another state. The Supreme Court 
 
8  § 101. 
9  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citation and internal quotation mark omitted). 
10  Id.; see also Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (saying that a mathematical expression 
is simply a “scientific truth” and unpatentable (quoting Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp., 306 
U.S. 86, 94 (1939))). 
11  See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981). 
12  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
13  130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
14  In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
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decision modified that holding, finding that the “test may be a useful and 
important clue or investigative tool,” but “it is not the sole test for deciding 
whether an invention is a patent-eligible ‘process’ under § 101.”15 
Unfortunately, the Court did not identify other tests that should be used, and 
the lower courts continue to rely on the machine-or-transformation test 
while rotely noting that it is not the only test.16 
II. MAYO V. PROMETHEUS 
The Supreme Court took up the issue of subject matter patentability 
again in Mayo v. Prometheus. The patents at issue related to medical 
diagnostic methods. Synthetic thiopurine compounds have been used to 
treat various immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorders. Because everyone 
metabolizes thiopurines differently, calculating the correct dose had proven 
to be difficult. The inventors of Prometheus’ patents discovered a specific 
correlation between the levels of metabolized drug in the body and the 
optimal drug dosage. They received two U.S. patents, Nos. 6,355,623 (the 
’623 patent) and 6,680,302 (the ’302 patent). The patents differ in some 
respects, but all the claims describe multistep processes that use metabolite 
measurements to help calculate optimal drug doses. Claim 1 of the ’623 
patent is representative. It recites: 
 A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an immune-
mediated gastrointestinal disorder, comprising: 
 (a) administering a drug providing 6-thioguanine to a subject having said  
  immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder; and 
 (b) determining the level of 6-thioguanine in said subject having said  
  immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, 
 wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230 pmol per 8x108 red  
  blood cells indicates a need to increase the amount of said drug  
  subsequently administered to said subject and 
 wherein the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 8x108  
  red blood cells indicates a need to decrease the amount of said drug  
  subsequently administered to said subject.17 
At first blush, Prometheus’ claims appear quite unusual. The inventors 
discovered a correlation between the level of 6-thioguanine metabolite in 
the blood and the optimal drug dose, yet their claims do not contain the step 
 
15  Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3221. 
16  Mark A. Lemley, Michael Risch, Ted M. Sichelman & R. Polk Wagner, Life After Bilski, 
63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1316 (2011) (“[T]he U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), patent litigants, 
and district courts have all continued to rely on the machine-or-transformation test in the wake of Bilski: 
no longer as the sole rule, but as a presumptive starting point that threatens to become effectively 
mandatory.”). 
17  U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 (filed Apr. 8, 1999) (emphasis added). Some claims from Prometheus’ 
patents do not include the first administering step. 
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of adjusting the drug dosage. Instead, claim 1 contains two “wherein” 
clauses that say that a particular metabolite level “indicates a need” to 
increase or decrease the dose. As written, claim 1 therefore appears to seek 
a patent for an unpatentable law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract 
idea rather than a patentable application. The district court, however, 
construed claim 1’s “indicates a need” language to cover instances in which 
a doctor is warned that an adjustment in dosage may be required.18 So long 
as the warning takes place, there can be infringement even when a doctor 
does not adjust the dose or adjusts the dose by relying on different 
parameters. Thus, by including the “wherein” limitations instead of the 
expected “adjusting step” limitations, Prometheus was able to significantly 
expand the scope of its patents. 
When Mayo Medical Laboratories (Mayo Labs)—a laboratory 
operated by the Mayo Clinic—announced that it would offer a thiopurine 
metabolite test to compete with Prometheus’ test, Prometheus immediately 
sued for patent infringement. Mayo Labs moved for summary judgment, 
asserting that the claims from Prometheus’ patents were not patent eligible 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The district court granted the motion, finding that 
the claims recite correlations between thiopurine drug metabolite levels and 
therapeutic efficacy or toxicity that are natural phenomena.19 Applying the 
machine-or-transformation test, the Federal Circuit reversed that decision.20 
The Federal Circuit found that the administering and determining steps 
result in transformations of the human body.21 Moreover, the claimed “steps 
involve a particular application of the natural correlations: the treatment of 
a specific disease by administering specific drugs and measuring specific 
metabolites.”22 Consequently, the Federal Circuit concluded that 
Prometheus’ claims were properly drawn to patentable subject matter. 
On March 20, 2012, the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit 
and found that Prometheus’ patents were not patent eligible. The Supreme 
Court explicitly discussed the distinction between an unpatentable law of 
nature and a patent-eligible application of such a law. The Court first noted 
that “Prometheus’ patents set forth laws of nature—namely, relationships 
between concentrations of certain metabolites in the blood and the 
 
18  Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., No. 04cv1200 JAH (RBB), slip op. at 17–
18 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2005). 
19  Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., No. 04cv1200 JAH (RBB), 2008 WL 
878910, at *6, *14 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008). 
20  Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The 
Federal Circuit initially ruled on this case earlier. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 
581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009). When Mayo appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, the Court 
remanded the case to the Federal Circuit in view of the recently decided Bilski, 130 S. Ct. 3218. The 
decision did not change the Federal Circuit’s view of the claims. See supra text accompanying notes 13–
14 for an explanation of the machine-or-transformation test. 
21  Prometheus, 628 F.3d at 1355. 
22  Id. 
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likelihood that a dosage of a thiopurine drug will prove ineffective or cause 
harm.”23 Accordingly, the Supreme Court framed the question by asking: 
“[D]o the patent claims add enough to their statements of the correlations to 
allow the processes they describe to qualify as patent-eligible processes that 
apply natural laws?”24 
Relying on an examination of each of the claimed limitations, the 
Supreme Court answered its own question in the negative. The Court 
concluded that none of the limitations individually or in combination were 
“sufficient to transform the nature of the claim.”25 The decision first 
examined the “administering” step. According to the Court, this step simply 
limited the use of the correlation to the relevant audience: doctors. Since 
limiting the use of an abstract idea to a particular technological environment 
cannot circumvent the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas, that step 
did not render the claims patentable.26 Second, the Court examined the 
“wherein” limitations. The Court characterized these limitations as “simply 
tell[ing] a doctor about the relevant natural laws, at most adding a 
suggestion that he should take those laws into account when treating his 
patient.”27 Apparently, it was so clear that these limitations could not 
change an unpatentable concept into a patentable application that the 
decision said nothing more. The decision then turned to the “determining” 
step. This step was well known in the prior art. Since conventional or 
obvious presolution activity is not normally sufficient to transform an 
unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application, the Court 
disregarded this step as well.28 
The Court’s analysis culminated with the conclusion “that the steps are 
not sufficient to transform unpatentable natural correlations into patentable 
applications of those regularities.”29 Thus, the Supreme Court held that three 
types of limitations do not make an unpatentable idea patent eligible: 
(1) limiting an unpatentable concept to a particular audience, (2) telling 
someone about the concept, or (3) adding a conventional or obvious 
presolution activity. 
The Mayo decision then pursued three additional lines of analysis that 
ostensibly corroborated its conclusion. First, the Court compared the 
Prometheus patent to the patents in Parker v. Flook30 and Diamond v. 
 
23  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1296 (2012). 
24  Id. at 1297. The correlation is the relationship between 230 pmol to 400 pmol per 8 x 108 red 
blood cells level of 6-thioguanine in the blood and the indicated drug dose adjustment. 
25  Id. 
26  Id. (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010)). 
27  Id. 
28  Id. at 1297–98. 
29  Id. at 1298. 
30  437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
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Diehr.31 In Flook, the claims involved a new formula for calculating an 
alarm limit for a catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons. The 
claimed process contained three steps: “an initial step which merely 
measures the present value of the process variable (e.g., the temperature); 
an intermediate step which uses an algorithm to calculate an updated alarm-
limit value; and a final step in which the actual alarm limit is adjusted to the 
updated value.”32 The Supreme Court found that Flook’s invention was not 
patent eligible “because once [the] algorithm is assumed to be within the 
prior art, the application, considered as a whole, contains no patentable 
invention.”33 Thus, under Flook, the claim’s point of novelty cannot be 
based on an unpatentable concept like a mathematical equation. 
Three years later, the Supreme Court decided Diehr. Like Flook, the 
Diehr patent also involved a mathematical equation. This time the equation 
was used in a process for molding and curing raw rubber into products. The 
claims added the steps of “installing rubber in a press, closing the mold, 
constantly determining the temperature of the mold, constantly 
recalculating the appropriate cure time through the use of the formula and a 
digital computer, and automatically opening the press at the proper time.”34 
Notably, the Court appeared to reject Flook’s approach by saying that “[i]t 
is inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements and then to 
ignore the presence of the old elements in the analysis.”35 However, the 
Diehr Court never explicitly overruled Flook. In the end, the Supreme 
Court held that Diehr’s invention was patent eligible because the Court did 
“not view [the] claims as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula, but 
rather to be drawn to an industrial process for the molding of rubber 
products.”36 
Even the Mayo Court had difficulty understanding why the additional 
steps in Diehr rendered its claims patent eligible, noting that “[t]hese other 
steps apparently added to the formula something that in terms of patent 
law’s objectives had significance.”37 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court 
never identified the “something” nor what “significance” that something 
had. Perhaps this confusion lies in the Court’s failure to acknowledge that 
Flook and Diehr are simply irreconcilable.38 However, the Supreme Court 
 
31  450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
32  Flook, 437 U.S. at 585 (footnote omitted). 
33  Id. at 594. 
34  Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187. 
35  Id. at 188; see also Lemley, supra note 6, at 1278 (stating that the Diehr decision repudiated the 
point-of-novelty approach applied in Flook). 
36  Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192–93. 
37  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1299 (2012) (emphasis 
added). 
38  See Kevin Emerson Collins, Propertizing Thought, 60 SMU L. REV. 317, 349 (2007) (“Flook and 
Diehr are difficult to reconcile.”); Horacio E. Gutiérrez, Peering Through the Cloud: The Future of 
Intellectual Property and Computing, 20 FED. CIR. B.J. 589, 590 (2011) (noting that Diehr and Flook 
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still seems to believe that these two decisions provide understandable 
guideposts; it concluded that Prometheus’ claims “present[ed] a case for 
patentability that is weaker than the (patent-eligible) claim in Diehr and no 
stronger than the (unpatentable) claim in Flook.”39 But that discussion is 
unhelpful given the confusion about Flook and Diehr. Until the Court 
provides a framework for explaining why certain types of limitations can 
transform an otherwise unpatentable concept into a patent-eligible claim, 
determinations of patentable subject matter will continue to be 
unpredictable. 
The Supreme Court next engaged in a second line of corroborating 
analysis. The Court noted that precedent has firmly established that “simply 
appending conventional steps, specified at a high level of generality, to laws 
of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas cannot make those laws, 
phenomena, and ideas patentable.”40 Indeed, several decisions say that 
adding insignificant postsolution limitations does not make an abstract idea 
patentable.41 But these decisions do not explain how to distinguish a 
limitation directed at postsolution activity from one directed at the solution 
itself. Mayo compared the addition of very general limitations to a claim 
that simply says “apply the algorithm.” This might suggest that adding 
specific limitations would have rendered Prometheus’ claims patentable. 
However, those claims already had a great deal of specificity. A change in 
dose was indicated if the level of 6-thioguanine strays from a range of 230 
pmol to 400 pmol per 8 x 108 red blood cells. Thus, this line of analysis 
could be interpreted as either disingenuous or the application of a standard 
akin to obscenity: The Court knows it when it sees it. 
Finally, the Supreme Court expressed concern “that patent law not 
inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of laws of 
nature.”42 The concern with overbroad claims is firmly rooted in subject-
matter patentability jurisprudence,43 and several commentators have 
suggested that it should be the sole basis for assessing subject matter 
patentability decisions.44 As interpreted by the district court, Prometheus’ 
claims served to “tie up the doctor’s subsequent treatment decision whether 
 
had “very similar facts” with opposite results); Lemley, supra note 6, at 1278 (characterizing the claims 
in Diehr and Flook as “exactly parallel”). 
39  Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1299. 
40  Id. at 1300. 
41  Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010); Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92; Parker v. Flook, 437 
U.S. 584, 590 (1978). 
42  Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301. 
43  Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68 (1972) (Douglas, J.) (noting that the claims before it were 
“so abstract and sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of the [mathematical formula]”); 
see also Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231 (“Allowing petitioners to patent risk hedging would pre-empt use of 
this approach in all fields, and would effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea.”). 
44  Lemley et al., supra note 16, at 1341 (proposing five factors for a scope-based § 101 
determination). 
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that treatment does, or does not, change in light of the inference he has 
drawn using the correlations.”45 Thus, the Court said that the fact that 
Prometheus’ patents “tie up too much future use of laws of nature simply 
reinforces our conclusion that the processes described in the patents are not 
patent eligible.”46 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has created panic in the patent 
world. By failing to provide a framework for determining when additional 
limitations can change an unpatentable concept into a patentable 
application, Mayo has created a kind of pessimistic uncertainty.47 Moreover, 
by discussing so many ways to reject a patent under § 101, the decision 
provides defendants an opportunity to latch onto one of these arguments to 
raise a patentable subject matter defense against a host of different kinds of 
patents.48 Almost all patents involve unpatentable concepts. Biological and 
pharmaceutical inventions inevitably involve natural phenomena.49 Many 
current patents involve the application of equations to a new problem using 
a computer, just as they did in Flook and Diehr.50 Moreover, almost any 
claim can be characterized as too broad depending on how the concept is 
defined.51 The fear is that Mayo has opened a Pandora’s Box of patentable 
subject matter defenses. 
I believe these fears are unwarranted. After all, the Court recognized 
that “all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply 
laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.”52 Moreover, the 
decision clearly suggested that some types of limitations could add 
 
45  Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1302. 
46  Id. 
47  See supra notes 2–3. 
48  See Michel Barclay, Medical Diagnostic Processes Not Patentable, IPDUCK (Mar. 20, 2012, 5:03 
PM), http://ipduck.blogspot.com/2012/03/medical-diagnostic-processes-not.html (“Other cases dealing 
with §101 involve adding conventional things such as a computer to abstract concepts such as 
advertising, and those patents will be highly suspect in the future as well.”); Tony Dutra, Computer, 
Medical Diagnostics, Gene Patents at Risk in Light of Mayo, Panelists Contend, PAT. TRADEMARK & 
COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (Apr. 4, 2012), http://www.bna.com/computer-medical-diagnostics-n1288490881
2/ (“[Intel’s Tina] Chappell predicted that the court would view the algorithms that are typically cited in 
software patents in the same way that it analyzed the law of nature in medical diagnostics in Mayo.”). 
49  See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (holding that patents to “isolated” human genes associated with a predisposition to breast 
cancer and ovarian cancer were patent eligible under § 101), vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012). The Supreme Court immediately vacated 
this decision after Mayo and remanded it to the Federal Circuit for further consideration. 
50  See, e.g., Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. 
WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 2431 (2012). The Federal Circuit held that a method 
for distributing Internet content was patent eligible under § 101. On May 21, 2012, the Supreme Court 
vacated this decision and remanded it to the Federal Circuit for further consideration in light of Mayo. 
WildTangent, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2431. 
51  See Tun-Jen Chiang, The Rules and Standards of Patentable Subject Matter, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 
1353, 1369–71 (explaining how claims can be viewed at different levels of abstraction). 
52  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012). 
107:423 (2012) Moderating Mayo 
 433 
“enough” to an unpatentable concept to make it patent eligible. Thus, the 
problem with Mayo was not that it radically constricted patentable subject 
matter. Rather, the problem was that Mayo failed to explain how to separate 
unpatentable concepts from patentable applications of those concepts. 
Reviving the out-of-favor point-of-novelty analysis would bring order 
to this doctrinal chaos and provide a more coherent framework for making 
patentable subject matter determinations. Interestingly, the Mayo decision is 
already unconsciously littered with point-of-novelty concepts. Thus, the 
advantage of the framework proposed below is that it builds on current 
jurisprudence. In fact, this framework also uses the existing (but heavily 
criticized) machine-or-transformation test.53 In sum, the recommendations 
offer a realistic and practical adjustment to the law, not an idealized view of 
what the law should be. In so doing, they show that Mayo can be 
understood, under the proposed point-of-novelty framework, as a modest 
rejection of a particular type of abstract claim rather than a fundamental 
change to patentable subject matter doctrine. 
III. THE POINT OF NOVELTY IN PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER 
For decades, courts have refused to consider the point of novelty in 
making decisions in patent law. Under this view, the law should not 
attribute any special significance to a subset of claim limitations regardless 
of how important those limitations are to the invention; the law treats all the 
limitations as equally important. This principle can trace its roots to at least 
as far back as Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement 
Co.,54 when the Supreme Court refused to consider the point of novelty in 
determining whether an item was permissibly repaired or improperly 
reconstructed. This principle has become one of the basic “commandments” 
of patent law and has affected many of its doctrines, including patentable 
subject matter.55 
In separate works, Mark Lemley and I have recently called this view 
into question.56 As Lemley puts it, “a patent regime that pays attention to 
what the patentee actually invented, not what the patent lawyer wrote down, 
 
53  Lemley et al., supra note 16, at 1338 (discussing the failures of the machine-or-transformation 
test). 
54  365 U.S. 336 (1961). 
55  Chao, supra note 6, at 1192–94 (explaining how patent law refuses to consider the heart of the 
invention—or, as Lemley calls it, the point of novelty—in the context of infringement, anticipation, 
obviousness, and the written description requirement). 
56  Id. at 1240 (“[I]t is time to . . . explicitly recognize that the heart of the invention has its place in 
patent law.”); Lemley, supra note 6, at 1255 (“[P]atent law would be better off focusing on the point of 
novelty in evaluating inventions.”); see also Kevin Emerson Collins, Getting Into the “Spirit” of 
Innovative Things: Looking to Complementary and Substitute Properties to Shape Patent Protection for 
Improvements, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1217, 1237 (2011) (arguing that the failure to consider the 
point of novelty is “highly problematic in the context of patent protection for improvements”). 
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is more likely to achieve the goal of promoting innovation.”57 Although 
Lemley and I both criticize patent law’s failure to consider the point of 
novelty in a wide-ranging number of doctrines, Lemley has been critical of 
applying point-of-novelty analysis in subject matter patentability 
determinations. 
Lemley is concerned that applying a point-of-novelty analysis in this 
context will return us “to the bad old days of restrictive patentable subject 
matter eligibility.”58 By that, Lemley is referring to Parker v. Flook. In 
Flook, the Supreme Court noted that the patent’s point of novelty was a 
mathematical algorithm. Since mathematical algorithms are not patentable, 
the Supreme Court concluded that the patent was invalid under § 101. 
Under this reasoning, any patent that was based on an unpatentable concept 
was not patent eligible. It did not matter what additional limitations were 
added. Of course that would mean that applications of unpatentable 
concepts are also not patentable. Michael Risch, Ted Sichelman, and R. 
Polk Wagner have all joined with Lemley in criticizing Flook’s point-of-
novelty methodology.59 To some extent, I agree with these critics. Flook 
improperly focused on the point of novelty to the exclusion of all of the 
other claim limitations. That methodology makes no sense because many 
inventions involve the application of an unpatentable abstract idea or 
natural phenomenon. Indeed, the Mayo decision recognized that, to assess 
whether a claim is properly directed at an application (as opposed to just 
the unpatentable concept), courts must consider those other claim 
limitations.60 In other words, under the approach the Supreme Court has 
already adopted in Mayo, a court must examine limitations that are not at 
the invention’s point of novelty. 
But the particular point-of-novelty analysis approach outlined by Flook 
was short lived.61 Under Diehr, the “claims must be considered as a whole,” 
it being “inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements and 
then to ignore the presence of the old elements in the analysis.”62 So when 
Mayo Labs focused on the limitations that covered the correlation between 
metabolite levels and drug doses, Prometheus responded that Mayo Labs 
was improperly considering the point of novelty.63 Prometheus argued that 
 
57  Lemley, supra note 6, at 1255. 
58  Id. at 1278. 
59  Lemley et al., supra note 16, at 1335 (arguing that the problem with Flook was “its apparent 
reliance on ‘point of novelty’ analysis”). 
60  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012). 
61  Brief for the Respondent at 1, 18, 29, Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (No. 10-1150); Lemley et al., supra 
note 16, at 1335–36 (saying Diehr “essentially overruled” Flook’s holding on the point of novelty). 
62  Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981). 
63  Brief for the Respondent, supra note 61. 
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it did not matter what the point of novelty was because the administering 
and determining steps made its claims patent eligible.64 
Although Diehr certainly took a step back from Flook, it was not a 
wholesale rejection of point-of-novelty analysis. Quite the contrary, Diehr 
also noted that “insignificant postsolution activity will not transform an 
unpatentable principle into a patentable process.”65 Analyzing what is or is 
not “insignificant postsolution activity” requires identifying the claim’s 
point of novelty. Indeed, the Mayo decision has broadly interpreted this 
concept to encompass limitations that are not central to the point of novelty 
regardless of when they take place.66 Thus, without explicitly holding that 
point-of-novelty analysis should be considered when analyzing patentable 
subject matter, the Supreme Court has called for precisely this kind of 
analysis in both Diehr and Mayo.67 
Unfortunately, these decisions do not explain how to consider a claim 
“as a whole” while simultaneously discounting limitations that are not 
strongly related to the point of novelty. Yet it is possible that these two 
seemingly contradictory requirements can be satisfied. In particular, 
applying a point-of-novelty approach to subject matter patentability can be 
divided into two parts. First, the limitation—or limitations68—that embody 
the point of novelty must be identified to determine whether it only 
describes an unpatentable concept. Those concepts could be laws of nature 
(e.g., Mayo), physical phenomena, or abstract ideas. As Mayo recognizes, 
this approach requires that courts view evidence of prior art as part of the 
patentable subject matter analysis.69 This may not be an easy task.70 But the 
current doctrine of patentable subject matter is already considered one of 
the most costly and complex.71 At least when a point-of-novelty approach is 
 
64  Id. at 32–34. 
65  Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92. The Supreme Court recently reiterated this view in Bilski v. Kappos. 
130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) (“Flook established that limiting an abstract idea to one field of use or 
adding token postsolution components did not make the concept patentable.”); see also Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 
at 1293–94. 
66  Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298 (discussing conventional or obvious presolution activity); see also In re 
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 957 n.14 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (noting that the Court’s reasoning on 
“postsolution” activity “is equally applicable to any insignificant extra-solution activity regardless of 
where and when it appears in the claimed process”), aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
67  See Chao, supra note 6, at 1192 (explaining how courts often use a point-of-novelty analysis 
using different language). 
68  The point of novelty may be embodied in more than one limitation. For the purposes of 
simplicity, this Essay uses the singular. 
69  Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297–98 (referring to the “determining” step as “conventional activity 
previously engaged in by scientists who work in the field”). 
70  Collins, supra note 56, at 1237 (“Identifying the ‘spirit’ of an invention is an information-
intensive and error-prone exercise. It takes work to identify the one or more ways in which a patented 
invention differs from the prior art.”). 
71  See Dennis Crouch & Robert P. Merges, Operating Efficiently Post-Bilski by Ordering Patent 
Doctrine Decision-Making, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1673 (2010). 
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explicitly applied to Prometheus’ claims below, the analysis proves far 
simpler. 
This Essay proposes a new point-of-novelty analysis for determining 
whether a patent is eligible under § 101. The proposal first determines 
whether any limitation covers an unpatentable concept. This can be 
accomplished using existing analytical tools. For example, the court could 
determine if the limitation satisfies the machine-or-transformation test.72 If 
the limitation embodying the point of novelty does not describe an 
unpatentable concept, the claim qualifies as patentable subject matter. If the 
limitation embodying the point of novelty merely describes one of these 
unpatentable concepts, the court should proceed to the second part of the 
analysis—examining the other limitations. 
If the other limitations are not directed at an unpatentable concept and 
have a strong nexus with the point of novelty, the claim is patentable. The 
nexus requirement excludes “insignificant postsolution activity” and other 
limitations that are not central to the point of novelty. Moreover, it requires 
courts to judge how important these other limitations are to the point of 
novelty. If they are not, these additional limitations cannot render an 
unpatentable concept patent eligible. Notably, this approach does not 
require that the other limitations be novel themselves. 
This approach follows the requirements set forth in Diehr and Mayo. It 
does not examine the limitation representing the point of novelty in total 
isolation as the Court did in Flook. Rather, it considers the point of novelty 
in the context of the claim as a whole. By accounting for the possibility that 
“other” limitations will demonstrate that the claim is directed toward a 
patentable application of an unpatentable concept, this approach closely 
follows the Mayo decision. Moreover, it should address Lemley’s concerns 
about the prior point-of-novelty analysis. 
To illustrate how this approach works, Part IV analyzes two variations 
of Prometheus’ claims. Specifically, it looks both at the claims Prometheus 
drafted and at the hypothetical claims it could have drafted. Applying the 
point-of-novelty analysis described above, I conclude that Prometheus 
could have received claims that are patentable. But I also find that the 
claims that it actually received do not qualify as patentable subject matter. 
IV. EXAMINING PROMETHEUS’ POINT OF NOVELTY 
A. The Claims that Could Have Been 
As mentioned earlier, neither claim 1 of the ’623 patent nor any of 
Prometheus’ other claims contain the expected third step of adjusting the 
 
72  The machine-or-transformation test is an important clue to determine whether a process qualifies 
as patentable subject matter. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3221 (2010). 
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drug dose according to the indicated parameters. Prometheus could have 
easily replaced the two “wherein” clauses with the following language: 
when the level of 6-thioguanine is determined to be less than about 230 pmol  
 per 8x108 red blood cells, increasing the amount of said drug subsequently  
 administered to said subject and 
when the level of 6-thioguanine is determined to be greater than about 400  
 pmol per 8x108 red blood cells, decreasing the amount of said drug  
 subsequently administered to said subject 
Analyzing this hypothetical claim serves two purposes. First, if the 
claim is both patentable and enforceable,73 then the Mayo decision will not 
upset patent law in the way so many foresee. In other words, deciding that 
the claims as drafted are not drawn to patentable subject matter does not 
undercut the entire medical diagnostic industry. Such a result merely 
requires its attorneys to draft more concrete claims. Although those claims 
may be somewhat narrower, they should still allow the industry to cover the 
way treatments change in response to particular tests. Second, the 
hypothetical claim illustrates how the point-of-novelty approach would 
handle a claim that appears patentable. 
Under the point-of-novelty approach outlined above, such a claim 
would be patentable. According to the Supreme Court, the inventors 
discovered a law of nature—namely, the specific correlation between the 
levels of metabolized drug in the body and the optimal drug dosage. The 
point of novelty is found in the new “increasing” and “decreasing” 
limitations outlined above. However, these limitations do not only describe 
an unpatentable concept. Rather, they are also directed to a concrete 
application—changing drug doses. This characterization can be confirmed 
by applying the machine-or-transformation test to the limitations. Since the 
two steps either increase or decrease drug doses, they satisfy the test by 
transforming the human body. 
Of course, the point-of-novelty approach only confirms what everyone 
thought they knew before Mayo—a hypothetical claim that contained a final 
dose-adjusting step would be patentable.74 Naturally, this raises questions 
concerning the reasons why Prometheus failed to draft its claims with this 
kind of limitation. When Justice Kagan asked this question, Prometheus’ 
counsel said that such a limitation “doesn’t correspond with how doctors 
 
73  The issue of enforcement relates to a question of divided infringement discussed infra notes 77–
80. 
74  Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, 47, Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (No. 10-1150). During oral 
argument, both parties were asked about such a hypothetical claim, and they both answered that it would 
be patentable. In an unscientific experiment, I provided the same hypothetical claim to my patent class 
and asked them to apply the Mayo decision and assess whether the claim was patent eligible. There were 
six groups of three. Each group was given twenty-four hours to provide their answer. Four out of the six 
groups found that the new claim remained unpatentable. 
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practice medicine.”75 Based on the patient’s condition, a doctor may decide 
to tolerate higher or lower levels of the metabolite before adjusting the 
dose.76 Apparently, Prometheus believed that adding an adjusting step 
would not allow it to capture the conduct of doctors when they varied from 
the parameters specified in the claim. But this concern was already 
addressed by the “about” limitation included in the drafted claims. Even if 
that safeguard was not adequate, Prometheus could have included a broader 
range in its claims. 
In its amicus brief, the Solicitor General suggested that Prometheus 
may have omitted the final adjusting step to avoid a different issue—the 
problem of divided infringement.77 There is no direct infringement of a 
method claim unless “one party exercises ‘control or direction’ over the 
entire process such that every step is attributable to the controlling party.”78 
If Prometheus had included the final adjusting step in its claims, Mayo Labs 
could have pointed out that, while they performed some of the steps, other 
steps were performed by doctors. Unless the doctors controlled or directed 
Mayo Labs—or Mayo Labs controlled or directed the doctors—there could 
be no infringement. 
However, this explanation does not justify the omission of a final 
adjusting step. Although the hypothetical claim could certainly face a 
problem of divided infringement, the same is true for the actual claims 
found in the Prometheus patents. Presumably, doctors are responsible for 
the first step of administering the drug and the final step of being warned 
about the correlation between the metabolite levels and any indicated 
adjustment. However, diagnostic laboratories are likely to perform the 
second step of determining the metabolite levels. Again, unless one party is 
controlling or directing the other, there can be no direct infringement.79 Of 
course, adding a concrete final adjusting step may exacerbate the divided 
infringement issue because different doctors may perform the original 
administering step and the final adjusting step. But that seems to be a 
problem that the jurisprudence on divided infringement needs to address.80 
The outcome of a determination on patentable subject matter should not 
turn on whether adding a limitation aggravates a divided infringement issue. 
 
75  Id. at 48. 
76  Id. at 48–49. 
77  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 31, Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 
1289 (No. 10-1150). 
78  Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
79  Moreover, without a predicate act of direct infringement, there can be no contributory 
infringement or inducement. 
80  In fact, since the original version of this Essay was published, an en banc panel of the Federal 
Circuit reviewed the issue of divided infringement in Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, 
Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
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B. The Claims as Drafted 
Consider next the application of the point-of-novelty analysis to the 
claims Prometheus actually obtained. Initially, this approach looks quite 
similar to the approach the Supreme Court first took in Mayo. Again, the 
first part of the analysis requires a court to identify the limitation or 
limitations that correspond to the point of novelty. There are two important 
facts that inform the analysis of Prometheus’ claims. First, the 
administering and determining steps are found in the prior art. Thus, those 
two steps do not lie at the point of novelty. Second, the inventors are 
credited with discovering the specific correlation between the levels of 
metabolized drug in the body and the optimal drug dosage. The two 
“wherein” clauses correspond to that discovery. Therefore, these two 
limitations embody the point of novelty. 
Next a court must determine whether these limitations describe an 
unpatentable concept. Again, the Mayo decision informs us that the 
limitations involve an unpatentable law of nature—the specific correlation 
between the levels of metabolized drug in the body and the optimal drug 
dosage. Applying the proposed test, there is nothing within the limitations 
that would suggest that they cover an application. The two limitations 
simply require that a doctor recognize the correlation between a particular 
metabolite level and how to adjust the dose. Certainly, recognizing the 
correlation does not satisfy the machine-or-transformation test. By itself, 
the doctor’s recognition is not tied to a machine, nor does it transform 
anything. Consequently, the “wherein” limitations are directed to 
unpatentable concepts, and the point-of-novelty analysis should proceed. 
The second part of the point-of-novelty analysis requires an 
examination of the other limitations. If they are not directed at an 
unpatentable concept and have a strong nexus with the point of novelty, the 
claim is patentable. Here, those limitations are the steps of administering a 
drug containing 6-thioguanine and determining the levels of 6-thioguanine 
found in the patient’s blood. Those steps clearly are not directed at an 
unpatentable concept. Indeed, the underlying Federal Circuit decision relied 
on these steps to show that they satisfy the machine-or-transformation test.81 
However, to render the claim patentable, these limitations must also 
have a sufficiently strong nexus with the point of novelty. But 
understanding the specific correlation between the levels of metabolized 
drug in the body and the optimal drug dosage does not affect the 
administering and determining steps. Unlike the patents in Flook and Diehr, 
there is nothing about the point of novelty that changes how those other 
steps are performed. Therefore, the administering and determining steps are 
not sufficiently related to the point of novelty to make Prometheus’ claims 
 
81  Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1355–56 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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patent eligible under § 101.82 Thus, the point-of-novelty analysis outlined 
above arrives at the same conclusion that the Supreme Court actually 
reached in Mayo—that Prometheus’ claims are not patent eligible. 
The point-of-novelty framework offered here builds on some important 
concepts that are already found in Mayo. In Mayo, the Supreme Court 
understood that adding some limitations to laws of nature, physical 
phenomena, or abstract ideas could render a claim patentable. The Court 
also understood that certain kinds of limitations would not suffice. Limiting 
an unpatentable concept to a particular audience, telling someone about the 
concept, or adding a conventional or obvious pre- or postsolution activity 
would not change the nature of an unpatentable concept. What was missing 
from Mayo (and Supreme Court jurisprudence in general) was a framework 
that tied these different strands together. 
The revised point-of-novelty approach serves this purpose. Assuming 
that the point of novelty is an unpatentable concept, this approach explains 
what types of additional limitations will render the concept patentable. 
Under this approach, concrete limitations that have a strong nexus with the 
unpatentable concept can make the concept patent eligible. In other words, 
if the additional limitations are not sufficiently concrete (e.g., understanding 
the concept or telling someone about the concept), or if the limitations are 
not strongly linked to the concept (e.g., limiting a patent to a particular 
audience), they cannot make a law of nature, physical phenomenon, or 
abstract idea patent eligible. 
At the same time, the point-of-novelty framework rejects much of 
Mayo’s dicta.83 This framework does not care how broadly the claim sweeps 
(as some advocate).84 Nor does it try to reconcile Flook and Diehr. Indeed, 
under the point-of-novelty analysis outlined here, Flook was probably 
decided incorrectly because the additional limitations describing a catalytic 
chemical conversion of hydrocarbons were both concrete and strongly 
linked to Flook’s formula. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the proposed point-of-novelty 
framework does not jeopardize a broad swath of medical, pharmaceutical, 
and technology patents. By explaining precisely what types of limitations 
must be added to an unpatentable concept, the point-of-novelty framework 
removes much of the uncertainty that surrounds Mayo. Moreover, the 
 
82  In contrast, the Federal Circuit said that “[t]he administering step . . . is not merely data-gathering 
but a significant transformative element.” Id. at 1356–57. This confuses two unrelated concepts. A step 
that transforms something to a new state may still have no connection to a claim’s point of novelty. 
83  The analyses comparing Prometheus’ claims to those in Flook and Diehr and discussing the 
scope of preemption were both said to “reinforce” the Court’s conclusion. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. 
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1298, 1302 (2012). Therefore, they are both technically dicta. 
84  See Lemley et al., supra note 16, at 1341. Since the Supreme Court appears reluctant to make a 
fundamental change to the law of patentable subject matter, this Essay does not address the merits of this 
or any other more far-reaching proposal. See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1305. Rather, this Essay seeks to apply 
current jurisprudence and prevent Mayo from being interpreted as a radical attack on patents. 
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Prometheus hypothetical and Flook example show that most patents should 
be found to be patent eligible under this framework. The only reason 
Prometheus’ patents failed this test was because they claimed a law of 
nature without adding any concrete steps that had a strong nexus with the 
discovery they made—a mistake that could have easily been avoided. 
CONCLUSION 
In Mayo, the Supreme Court held that the limitations found in 
Prometheus’ claims did not add “enough” to the law of nature Prometheus 
discovered to render that discovery patent eligible. Unfortunately, the 
Court’s failure to explain what might be “enough” casts doubt on many 
patents that have properly been considered patent eligible. Many 
commentators fear that Mayo marks a fundamental shift in subject matter 
patentability jurisprudence that may radically limit patents. This Essay 
offers a more restrained view of Mayo by reviving the out-of-favor point-
of-novelty analysis. Importantly, Mayo already contains the seeds of this 
revival. Thus, the current proposal does not reject Mayo, but builds on it. 
When a patent’s point of novelty is based on a law of nature, natural 
phenomenon, or abstract idea, this proposal defines what types of 
limitations can transform the unpatentable concept into a patentable 
application of the concept. That occurs when the additional limitations are 
concrete and have a strong nexus to the unpatentable concept. 
This proposal achieves two goals. First, it maintains patent eligibility 
for many medical, pharmaceutical, and technology patents that might be 
jeopardized by a less nuanced reading of Mayo. Second, the point-of-
novelty framework creates clearer boundaries between claims covering 
unpatentable concepts—like Prometheus’ claims—and claims directed at 
patentable applications of those concepts. In sum, if and when Mayo is 
understood as the initial step toward a point-of-novelty framework for 
patentable subject matter, it will not create the havoc that so many fear. 
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